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ABSTRACT
The present research was conducted in order to in
vestigate the influence of role

(actor/observer)

and

three situational variables on the attribution p r o c e s s .
One hundred twenty male subjects were run in pairs and
served as both actor and observer of the experimental
task which was answering 30 spatial visualization prob
lems.

Two console panels were employed for the actor to

make his responses to the problems and to provide pre
programmed feedback to both the actor and observer as to
whether or not the actor had responded correctly.
The results indicated that when subjects are involved
in novel situations, whether they are performing the u n 
familiar task or observing another perform it, their
attributions are significantly influenced by a primacy
effect for feedback of s u c c e s s .

It was also found that

when subjects willingly involve themselves in situations
which they know beforehand may result in negative out
comes and feel that their actions are capable of directly
influencing the outcome, they will accept responsibility
for such negative outcomes rather than making external
attributions to explain such occurrences.

The final major

finding was that the self interest of observers was
capable of exerting a significant influence upon the
directionality

(external/internal) of their attributions.

vii

The relevance of these findings to the divergent attribu
tion hypothesis and other attribution research were dis
cussed and potential applications of the major findings of
the present study to training situations were explored.

viii

INTRODUCTION
In general,

theories of attribution deal w i t h the

processes whereby people ascribe intentions,

traits,

feelings, and characteristics to other persons in their
social environment.

Attribution theories also attempt to

account for the way in which people formulate causal
interpretations of the events which occur in their
environment.

Heider

(1958) has suggested that the attri

bution process entails one's interpretation of events as
"...being caused by particular parts of the relatively
stable environment."

Kanhouse and Hanson

(1972) have

indicated that the attribution process serves to further
the individual's need to make sense of the world around
him.

A person thus makes both causal and descriptive

inferences to accomplish this aim.
The attribution of traits may serve not only to
describe the people with whom one interacts but also to
explain their behavior.

Attribution is thus a self

serving process performed in order to understand the con
tents of our environment.

The process itself involves an

analysis of causality by means of which one decides which
effects are to be attributed to which of several potential
causal factors available.

Kelly

(1967, 1971,

1972)

has

suggested that the attribution process involves one's
application of his knowledge of causal relations among

1
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persons and events in order to exercise control over his
environment.
Jones and Nisbett

(1972) have examined the attribu

tion process from the perspective of both the actor, the
person performing the task, and the observer,
witnessing the behavior.

the person

These authors have noted a

widespread tendency for the attributions of actors to
differ considerably from those of observers.
Nisbett

Jones and

(1972) have suggested that "...there is a pervasive

tendency for actors to attribute their actions to situa
tional requirements whereas observers tend to attribute
the same actions to stable personal dispositions"

(p. 80).

A number of experimental studies have been cited by Jones
and Nisbett in support of their position.
Because of the methodology employed,

the study re

ported by Jones, Rock, Shaver, Goethals, and Ward

(196 8)

is of crucial importance to the present experiment.

A

series of six experiments was conducted in order to study
the effects of varying feedback patterns of success and
failure on attributions of intellectual ability.
experiment,

In each

the same series of extremely difficult test

items were employed as a supposed measure of intelligence.
In the first four experiments subjects were informed that
they had correctly answered 10 randomly distributed items
and that a stimulus person

(SP), whose performance they

had observed, had correctly answered 15 of the 30 test
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items in a pattern wherein:

a) correct responses were

randomly distributed among the 30 items;

b) correct

responses were concentrated primarily in the first portion
of the test; or c) correct responses were concentrated
towards the end of the test.

In the fifth experiment

only the ascending and descending patterns of correct
responses were utilized.

It was found that observer

subjects in the descending success conditions rated their
SPs as more intelligent than SPs in the two other condi
tions.

The observers also predicted that SPs in the

descending condition would perform better on a future
similar test and favorably distorted recall of the de
scending SPs performance on the test

(Jones, et a l ., 1968).

In the sixth experiment a subject and an SP simul
taneously solved the test items and received feedback
after each response.
so that the accomplice

However the patterns were reversed
(SP) attained a random pattern of

ten correct responses, whereas the subject learned that
he had answered 15 of the 30 items in a random,
or descending pattern of responses.

ascending,

A second series of

items was then administered and subjects recorded their
answers to each item plus a prediction of whether their
partner would respond to the item correctly

(Jones, et a l .,

1968).
The ascending success subjects predicted better per
formance for themselves on the second series than either
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the random or descending feedback subjects.

In all con

ditions subjects were able to accurately remember their
patterns of success and failure on the first test without
distortion and could also accurately recall their partner's
response patterns.

It was also found that subjects did

not re-evaluate their own intelligence as a result of
their performance on the first test although ascending
subjects made self attributions of higher motivation
levels than did descending subjects.

Despite the fact

that the experimental instructions emphasized that all
items were of equal difficulty,

ascending subjects re

ported that the items in the latter portion of the series
were of less difficulty than those in the initial posi
tion and descending subjects felt that item difficulty
varied in the reverse direction.

Thus when subjects were

focusing on their own actions there was a greater tendency
to ascribe performance fluctuation to changes in item
difficulty than when subjects were observing the actions
of another person in the earlier experiments

(Jones,

et a l . , 1968) .
Jones and Nisbett
wherein:

(1972) have also cited studies

a) subjects were presented with written

descriptions of actions performed by other persons and
asked to make causal attributions with respect to those
behaviors

(McArthur,

1970; 1972);

b) subjects attributed

causality for positions advocated by others in essays
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(Jones and Harris, 1967; Nisbett and Caputo,

1971); and

c) actors and observers made causal attributions for the
actor's behavior

(Nisbett, Legant, and Marecek,

According to Jones and Nisbett

1971).

(19 72), these studies have

supported the position that actors tend to ascribe the
causes of their behavior to external situational factors
whereas observers attribute that same behavior to internal
dispositions on the part of the actor.
An experiment conducted by Storms

(1973) was of

importance with respect to actor/observer differences in
attribution because in addition to supporting the Jones
and Nisbett

(19 72) position, it identified a method of

upsetting the basic directionality of actor/observer
attributions.

The effects of altering visual perspectives

by means of videotape replays of actors and observers was
investigated.

Two actor subjects engaged in a brief "get

acquainted" conversation which was witnessed by two o b 
server subjects,

then both actors and observers made

causal attributions about the actor's behavior during the
conversation.

Visual orientation was manipulated by re

playing videotapes of the behavior before the subjects
completed the attribution questionnaires.

When subjects

either saw no videotape replay or saw one that merely
repeated their original visual orientation,
tended to make situational attributions.

the actors

The observers,

on the other hand, made primarily internal dispositional
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attributions to the actors to explain the behavior
witnessed.

Actors who watched a videotape replay which

focused on their own behavior were less situational and
more dispositional in their attributions of their b e 
havior.

Observers who viewed a video tape of the other

participant with whom the actors had conversed attri
buted the a c t o r s 1 behavior more to situational external
factors than to internal dispositional factors of the
actor.

Thus a reversal of a c t o r s ’ and observers'

visual

perspectives via video tape feedback resulted in a re
versal in the directionality of their respective attribu
tions

(Storms,

1973).

These findings were interpreted as support for the
Jones and Nisbett

(19 72) position and it was suggested

that a major reason for this attributional orientation is
the different visual perspectives of the actors and ob
servers regarding the behavior under consideration.
Results reported by Synder and Jones

(1974) have

identified yet another method of upsetting the directional
ity of the actor/observer attribution processes, namely,
increasing the salience of the situational constraints on
the observed behavior.

A series of five experiments was

conducted in which subjects made attitude attributions
based on opinion statements of others which had been
written under high constraints.

In the first experiment

subjects wrote pro-marijuana or pro-Castro essays.

Half

7

the subjects were given arguments that could be included
in their essays and half received no such "priming".
Upon completion of the essays,

subjects who had written

pro-Castro essays read pro-marijuana essays and vice
versa.

Subjects were informed of whether the essay they

were to read had been "primed" or not.

Regardless of

whether the essays were identified as "primed" or not
primed,

subjects attributed attitudes to the writer which

were consistent with those expressed in the essay.
the second experiment,
reading the essays,

In

instead of both writing and

subjects merely read them although

they were still informed of the primed or unprimed
character of the essays.

The results were identical to

those of the first experiment.
The third experiment

(Synder and Jones,

1974) was

conducted to investigate the possibility that being
assigned to write an essay on one topic doesn't alert the
writer to the constraints on someone assigned to write on
another topic.

In this experiment all subjects wrote and

read pro-Castro essays.

In addition to the dependent

measures employed in the earlier experiments,

the subjects

were also asked to indicate whether the essay writer was
allowed to choose or was assigned the topic.

The results

indicated that although the subjects had been assigned
the same essay topic as the target person,

they still

attributed attitudes consistent with those in the essays
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to the target persons.
In the fourth experiment

(Synder and Jones,

1974)

subjects both wrote and read pro and con essays about
the legalization of abortion.

All subjects were assigned

the positions advocated in the essays.

For both groups

of subjects, run in separate rooms, half were assigned
a prolegalization position and half an antilegalization
position.

Essays were then exchanged between rooms,

each subject receiving and reading an essay advocating
the same position that his essay had supported.

The

instructions, which indicated the writer's lack of choice
in selecting the position advocated, were attached to
easy essay.

As in the earlier experiments,

subjects

attributed attitudes to the writers that w ere consistent
with the position advocated in the essays.
In the final experiment,

subjects were not only

assigned the position to be advocated, pro- or anti- free
federal medical care, but also were instructed to in
corporate specific arguments into their essays.

In addi

tion, one group of subjects was allowed to chose which
side, pro or con, of the issue to support.

Each subject

read an essay written by another subject whose essay
assignment was the same as the reader's.

All readers

were informed of the exact conditions under which the
essays had been written.

The results indicated that as

the constraints on the actor's behavior became more
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salient, e.g. the reader was informed that the writer
had no choice in selecting the position advocated and
was required to use specific arguments in writing the
essay,

their impact on the actor becomes recognized by

the observer as a casual factor influencing the behavior.
In terms of the Jones and Nisbett

(1972) position,

the

increased emphasis on the situational factors caused the
observers to shift from attributing behavior to internal
dispositions of the actor to perceiving the external
situational factors as responsible for the behavior.
A study by Worchel and Andreoli

(1974) reported

findings that were contrary to the Jones and Nisbett
(1972) position.

Their study investigated the influence

of a norm of reciprocity on the attribution process.

The

norm of reciprocity was elicited during the initial inter
action between the subject and a confederate.
waiting for a second subject

While

(actually a confederate)

to

arrive the subject was requested to alphabetize a stack
of answer sheets.

In the friendly condition,

federate arrived and offered assistance.
friendly condition,
help and stated,

the con

In the u n 

the confederate did not offer to

"Boy, t h a t ’s a dumb thing to do.

They

can get some people to do anything in these experiments."
Locus of causality was manipulated by having the
experimenter tell the subject that the other subject's
(confederate's)

behavior

(helped/did not help)

had been
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predicted by a personality test which she had taken at
the beginning of the experiment.

In this manner,

the

experimenter emphasized that the reasons for the con
federate's behavior were internal and not a result of
situational factors

(forced attribution condi t i o n ) .

In

the free-attribution condition no reference to behavioral
predictions based on personality tests was made.
The findings

(Worchel and A n d r e o l i , 1974) were con

trary to predictions based on the Jones and Nisbett
(1972) position.

Subjects in the free attribution con

dition ascribed causality for the confederate's behavior
to situational factors and not to internal dispositions
of the actor.

This direction of causal attributions was

more pronounced when future interaction with the con
federate was anticipated.
In this experiment subjects in all conditions experi
enced the reciprocity invoking manipulation.

It is

plausible that the norm of reciprocity influenced the
subjects to diverge from the usual mode of attribution,
i.e.

that proposed by Jones and Nisbett

(1972),

in order

to serve their own self interest by not placing con
straints on any future interactions with the other person.
Thus, the findings

(Worchel and Andreoli,

1974) may be

interpreted not as having refuted the hypothesis of Jones
and Nisbett

(19 72) with respect to actor versus observer

attributions, but rather as having identified a variable,
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the reciprocity norm, which had the effect of altering
the attribution process.
Several other studies have reported results which
suggest that self interest exercises an effect on the
attribution process employed by subjects to explain their
behavior.

In an investigation dealing with attributions

of responsibility for particular outcomes
H a r r i s , 1975),

(Harvey and

subjects were designated "decision makers"

and were requested to select one of two experimental
tasks to be performed by another subject at a later time.
The "decision makers" were given only ambiguous informa
tion describing the two tasks but were afforded either a
difficult or an easy opportunity to obtain clarification
of the precise nature of the tasks.
in which a student

The situation was one

(confederate) who was unfamiliar with

the tasks was supposedly substituting for the regular
experimenter.

The student substitute indicated that al

though he was unable to clarify the highly technical
written descriptions of the tasks which the subject
received the regular experimenter would be able to do so.
In the easy opportunity condition,

the subject was told

that the experimenter was in another room in the building.
In the difficult opportunity condition he was described
as being in another building across campus.

The con

federate told the subjects that he would wait for them
if they wanted to go and get clarification from the
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experimenter.

After making the decision without seeking

additional information,

the regular experimenter entered

the room and provided explicit information about the task
which the subject had selected.

Half the subjects were

led to believe that the task was very pleasant and the
other half learned that it was very unpleasant.
Subjects who learned that their decision would lead
to pleasant consequences for another person attributed
greater responsibility for the outcome to themselves than
did subjects who were informed that the consequences would
be unpleasant.

It was found that in the unpleasant con

sequence conditions subjects who had received an easy
opportunity to gain additional information attributed less
responsibility to themselves than did subjects who were
offered the difficult opportunity.

It was suggested that

attribution of responsibility is made in a manner con
sistent with the self interest of the attributor
and Harris,

1975).

(Harvey

Similar findings with respect to the

influence of self interest on attributions of
responsibility have been reported in a number of recent
studies

(Johnson,

19 7 C ; Harvey,
However,

Feigenbaum,

Harris,

and Weiby,

and Barnes,

1964; Beckman,

1975).

not all the research reported dealing with

the influence of self interest on attributions of
responsibility has yielded consistent results.
Biecbrauer,

and Polly

(1974)

Ross,

conducted an experiment in
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which professional teachers and college students in
structed an 11 year old boy

(a confederate)

in spelling.

The subjects were separated from the confederate by a one
way mirror.

Subjects were informed via worksheets that

the pupil had either done exceptionally well or had done
very poorly.

The subject's teaching performance and

its apparent outcome

(success/failure) were witnessed by

observers.

Contrary to earlier findings

Feigenbaum,

and Weiby,

1964; Beckman,

(Johnson,

1970), instructors

rated their own efforts and abilities as less important
than those of the student in the success condition and
as more important in the failure condition.

This direc

tion of attribution was more pronounced among the pro
fessional teachers than among the undergraduate subjects.
Comparison of attributions made by instructors and o b 
servers were not statistically significant.

Observers

also saw the instructor as more responsible for failure
than for success.

None of the subject groups

professional teachers, non-professionals)

(observers,

attributed

responsibility for failure to the student nor did any
group of subjects attribute responsibility for success
to the instructor.
Another variable which may influence the attribution
orocess is the operation of "chance" or "luck" in
determining the outcomes of one's behavior.

In an in

vestigation of observer's and actor's reactions to the
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actor's receipt of chance outcomes subjects were informed
that the experiment would consist of two five minute
periods during which the actors would be required to make
constructions with a magnetic play kit
Friedman,

1975).

The first period was conducted without

positive or negative consequences.
the first period,

(Apsler and

Upon conclusion of

the experimenter took a photograph of

the construction supposedly to be judged later by another
group of subjects and then informed the actor that she
had been assigned to the reward/no reward condition.

The

reward consisted of an extra hour of credit whereas the
punishment was no extra credit.

Actors and observers

received instructions that were intentionally ambiguous
in describing the method of assigning subjects to the
reward/no reward conditions.

Upon assignment of the

reward both actors and observers who had witnessed the
actors'

performances and heard the condition to which she

was assigned, completed the questionnaires that served
as the dependent measures.
Observers rated the rewarded a c t o r s ' performances
significantly higher than the non-rewarded actors'
formances.

pe r 

The rewarded actors were also seen as more

"good" than were the non-rewarded actors.

The outcome

manipulation was also found to affect the actors'
of their own performances.

ratings

Rewarded actors rated their

performances higher than did non-rewarded actors.

In
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addition, non-rewarded actors did not attribute their ou t 
comes to chance any more than rewarded recipients did
(Apsler and Friedman, 1975).

These findings were contrary

to the position advocated by Jones and Nisbett

(1972)

concerning attribution differences between actors and
observers insofar as there was no evidence that actors
attributed the outcome to situational factors or that o b 
servers attributed it to the a c t o r s .
These findings

(Apsler and Friedman,

1975)

however,

may be interpreted as support for the position that the
divergent attributions of actors and observers advocated
by Jones and Nisbett

(1972) are capable of being altered

by manipulating the consequences of the behavior under
consideration.

Both actors and observers were informed

that the actor, after having performed the task for five
minutes, had been assigned to either a reward or no reward
condition.

This was the final bit of information communi

cated to both observers and actors before they completed
the questionnaire which served as the dependent measure.
Under such conditions, both actors and observers rated
the actor's task performance more positively wh e n she was
rewarded than when no reward was received.

This finding

was interpreted as supporting Lerner's "just world"
hypothesis which,

in essence, maintains that people get

what they deserve and deserve what they get.
(1965)

Lerner

found that randomly assigned rewards influence
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observers' perceptions of another's performance in such a
manner that the performance of rewarded workers was seen
as superior to that of unrewarded workers.
In addition,

the prediction that actors would tend to

attribute the assignment of reward/no reward to external
factors whereas observers would attribute the assignment
to the actors' performances was not supported.

Instead,

it was found that 20% of both observers and actors in
dicated that the basis for assignment of the reward/no
reward condition was the actor's performance whereas 62%
of the observers and 47% of the actors believed that the
assignment was randomly determined
1975).

(Apsler and Friedman,

Such results suggest that increasing the saliency

of the consequences of one's behavior exerts an influence
on the attribution processes employed by both actors and
observers with respect to the performance of that behavior.
In summary,

the preponderance of the research evidence

to date indicates that the Jones and Nisbett

(1972) posi

tion is essentially correct w i t h respect to the basic
modes of attribution employed by actors and observers.
The research further suggests that the actor/observer
attribution processes may be altered by increasing the
salience of particular aspects of the behavioral situa
tion.

Studies which reported results contrary to the

Jones and Nisbett

(1972)

position

1974; Apsler and Friedman,

1975;

(Worchel and Andreoli,
and Ross, Bierbrauer,
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and Polly, 1974) may be interpreted as having identified
factors which are capable of "upsetting" the basic
directionality of actor/observer attributions.
The vast majority of the experimental situations
employed to investigate the Jones and Nisbett

(1972)

hypothesis did not assess the respective attributions of
subjects in both actor and observer roles.

Instead,

these studies focused on attributions of subjects who
served as actors or as observers.

In addition a number

of the studies reported used observers who based their
attributions on written descriptions of another's actions
rather than on actual observations of the behavior.
The -^resent experiment was conducted in order to
provide a more accurate assessment of the influence of
role on the attribution process.

This was accomplished

by collecting attribution data from each subject function
ing in both actor and observer roles involving the same
behavioral situation.
Jones and Nisbett

This was done in order to test the

(1972) hypothesis that the directional

ity of attributions is a function of the role of the
attributor.

Such a procedure enabled the potency of the

effect of role upon the attribution processes of individual
subjects,

functioning as both actors and observers,

to be

ascertained more clearly than in any previous research.
An additional purpose of the experiment was to identify
further the effects of a number of situational factors
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on the actor/observer divergent attribution hypothesis
(Jones and Nisbett,

1972).

Another purpose of the study

was to replicate the earlier findings of Jones, et a l .,
1968.
The present research investigated the effects of
role, reward,

feedback of correct responses,

consequences on the attribution process.

and future

The seven

dependent variables that assessed the attribution process
were responsibility for reward allocations, ability,
motivation,

liking for the other subject, performance,

task difficulty, and expected future performance.
At the outset of the experiment an ambiguous situa
tion was created wherein both subjects participated in
determining the amount of research credit they received
for performing the task.

This enabled the reward variable

to be experimentally manipulated.

Subjects were then

required to solve a number of spatial problems presented
via a slide projector.
and observer.
tion.

Each subject served as both actor

This constituted the role variable manipula

Responses were made by pushing the appropriate

buttons on a specially designed console panel which pr o 
vided immediate feedback as to the correctness of the
responses to both actor and observer.
Two patterns of success feedback were employed.

In

the ascending pattern the majority of correct responses
were concentrated in the latter portion of the problems.
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In the descending pattern the correct responses clustered
primarily in the initial half of the problems.

Future

consequences were manipulated by either informing the
subjects that they would be given the opportunity to work
as a team in solving similar problems at a future date in
competition with other teams for a large financial reward
or by informing them that they would both merely be re
quired to perform the task w i t h no mention of any future
interaction.

A control condition was also employed where

in consequences and reward were held constant.
Upon completion of the task both actors and observers
filled out a questionnaire dealing wit h the seven
dependent variables used to assess the attribution pro
cess.

Subjects recall of the a c t o r ’s performance and pr e 

dictions of his future performance on a similar task were
also ascertained.
A number of hypotheses regarding the effect of the
particular variables upon the attribution processes were
tested:

I.

Role
Based on the theoretical position of Jones and Nisbett
(1972) and the experimental results reported by Jones
and Harris
A.

(1967)

it was hypothesized that:

In situations wherein reward and future inter
actions are not manipulated actors would tend to
make external attributions to explain their
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behavior whereas observers would tend to explain
that same behavior by making internal disposi
tional attributions to the actor.
B.

When situational factors such as high reward are
combined with ascending feedback patterns of
success, attributions of actors will be more
internal than when such situational factors are
not manipulated.

C.

Role,

i.e. actor/observer, will exert a more pro

found influence on the attribution processes of
subjects than will their immediate past experi
ence .
1.

Thus:

First and second order actors should demonstrate
similar attributions in the same experimental
c onditions .

2.

First and second order observers should
demonstrate similar attributions under the
same experimental conditions.

II.

Situational Factors
A.

Reward Outcomes:
1.

Based upon results reported by Johnson,
Feigenbaum,

and Weiby

and Harris and Harvey

(1964), Beckman

(1970),

(1975) , it was hypothe

sized that when both subjects interact in
Producing an outcome

(high/low reward)

attributions of responsibility will be
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governed by self interest.
reward)

Positive

(high

outcomes will be attributed primarily

to oneself by both subjects whereas negative
(low reward)

outcomes will be attributed to

the other person.
2.

Based upon the theoretical position of Lerner
(1965) and the experimental results reported
by Apsler and Friedman

(1975), it was hypothe

sized that both actors and observers would
make more positive attributions
for responsibility)

(other than

under high reward con

ditions .
B.

Feedback of Success:

Based on the theoretical

position of Jones and Nisbett

(1972) and the

experimental results reported by Jones,
(1968)
1.

et a l .

it was hypothesized that:

An ascending pattern of success would be
perceived by observers as indicative of lower
ability and poorer performance on the part of
the actor than similar attributions made by
observers witnessing a descending pattern of
successes.

2.

This pattern of attributions would be reversed
when actors are reflecting upon their own
behavior.
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C.

Future Consequences:
Worchel and Andreoli

Based on the findings of
(1974)

it was hypothesized

that the prospect of future interaction for the
purpose of gaining a large financial reward
would influence o b s e r v e r s ' attributions in
accordance wit h self interest.

Thus they would

emphasize situational factors in making causal
attributions to explain the a c t o r ’s behavior when
that behavior was perceived as poor and emphasize
internal factors when the actor's performance was
perceived positively.

METHOD
Subjects
Subjects were 120 male undergraduates enrolled in an
introductory psychology course at Louisiana State Univer
sity who volunteered to participate in the experiment for
additional course credit.

All subjects were run in pairs

by a male experimenter.

Apparatus
A slide projector was used to present 30 spatial
problems to the subject.

Each problem consisted of an

array of three spatial stimulus arrangements,

in which

the relationship among components was systematically
varied from one arrangement to the next, and four spatial
arrangements,

lettered A through D, from which the subject

selected the one that would correctly complete the
sequence.

The problems were constructed in such a manner

that there was no obviously correct solution to any of
them.

A total of 60 such slides, subdivided into two 30

item presentations, was employed.

The slides were pre

sented automatically at a constant exposure time of 20
seconds.
Two specially designed console panels were utilized
for the actor to select his answers and to provide feed
back of the correctness of the response to both actors
and observers.

The actor console consisted of a row of
23
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six alternate red and green lights which horizontallyspanned the face of the console.

A row of toggle

switches, numbered one through 30, corresponding to the
problems, was located three and one half inches directly
below the row of lights.

A second row of four buttons,

lettered A through D, was located three and one quarter
inches below,

and centered on, the row of 30 numbered

toggle switches.

Operation of the actor console involved

flipping the numbered switch,

corresponding to the

stimulus presented, and simultaneously depressing the
lettered button indicating the answer selected.

Depress

ing the buttons in this fashion illuminated either the
red or the green lights for the particular problem to
which the subject was responding.

Illumination of a red

light indicated that the response was incorrect whereas
a green light meant that the correct response had been
made.

Once pressure was removed from the buttons, the

light immediately extinguished.

The actor console was

designed so that by means of a gang switch the illumina
tion pattern of red and green lights could be programmed.
Two such programs, both consisting of fifteen green and
fifteen red illuminations, were employed.

In the ascending

program green light illuminations were concentrated
primarily in the latter half of the 30 responses, whereas
this pattern was reversed in the descending program.
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Fig.

1.

Feedback patterns employed in ascending and
descending conditions.

The observer console differed from the actor console
in that it contained no response buttons although the rows
of feedback lights were identical to those on the actor
console.

The two consoles were wired so that a feedback

light which was illuminated on the actor console was
simultaneously lit on the observer console.

When the light

extinguished on the actor console it also extinguished on
the observer console.

In this manner both actor and

observer simultaneously received feedback as to the
correctness of the actor's responses.
The experimental apparatus also included a canister
containing six ping pong balls each marked wit h the number
"three" or "one" which was used to determine the subject's
reward for participating in the experiment.

A wooden

partition was also employed to screen actors from o b 
servers during the conduct of the experiment.
were projected on a 4' by 6' screen.

The slides

26

The two consoles were mounted on tables separated
by the partition so that both subjects, when seated at
the tables, were facing the screen.

The problems were

presented on the screen via a slide projector located m i d 
w a y between the tables.

Thus subjects were situated

such that both viewed the problems and their respective
console panels although, because of the partition,
neither subject could see the other.
Two questionnaires were utilized to assess the
effects of the environmental manipulations on the subjects'
attribution processes.

The only difference between the

two questionnaires was that one contained two items
which assessed the degree of responsibility for the reward
outcome which subjects attributed to themselves and to the
other person.

This questionnaire wa s completed by sub

jects in the reward conditions.

The other questionnaire

did not contain any items concerning responsibility for
reward and was completed by subjects in the standard re
ward conditions.

Except for this difference,

the two

questionnaires were identical insofar as they assessed
the subjects' attributions of ability, performance,
effort, problem difficulty,
other subject

luck,

and attractiveness of the

(see Appendix A ) .

Procedure
All experimental sessions were conducted by a male
experimentor.

In the initial phase of the experiment,
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subjects were informed that the study was being conducted
under a grant from the University to study the psycho
logical ramifications of men working in close proximity
at intellectually demanding tasks.

Subjects were also

shown two examples of the type of problems which com
prised the experimental task.

They were told that they

would be required to solve 30 such problems, which would
be presented via a slide projector,

selected from a

larger battery of similar problems which had been designed
to measure abstract reasoning and intellectual ability
of people at the very highest levels of intelligence.
They were also informed that they should not be surprised
if they failed to get a large number of correct answers
since the test was specifically constructed to discrim
inate at the highest levels of intelligence in the
population.
The E explained that each subject would have the
opportunity to solve the problems and to act as an ob 
server.

The observer's function was described as re

quiring that the subject "pay attention to what's going
on".
After the subjects had been familiarized with the
operation of the consoles and the nature of the experi
mental task,

the E requested one of them to flip a coin

to determine which of the two would perform the task
first.

The E informed this subject that if the coin came
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up heads he would go first, if tails,
would go first.

the other subject

The subject selected to flip the coin

was determined by his position relative to the E.

A

table of random numbers was employed to determine which
subject, left or right, would be requested to toss the
coin.

When the first actor had been identified in this

manner,

the E then stated that since A had determined who

was to attempt the task first, B would draw to determine
the r e w a r d .

The drawing was made from a cannister con

taining six ping pong balls, each marked with a "one" or
a "three".

Subjects were told that they would receive

either one or three points for performing the experiment
depending upon which number they drew.
Subjects in the future interaction condition were
then informed that the cost of the experiment was $100.00
less than the amount received in the grant from the
University.

Since all the money had to be spent the E

had decided to allow the subjects the opportunity, at a
later date,

to work as a team in solving another set of

p ro b l e m s , similar to those to be used in the present
experimental session,

in a competition wit h other teams

of subjects who had participated in the experiment.

The

team that solved the most problems in this future competi
tion would receive the $100.00 to divide between them.
Prior to the actual performance of the experimental
task the E programmed the consoles so that the responses
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of the subject who served as the first actor would yield
an ascending or descending pattern of correct answers
and that of the second actor would result in the opposite
pattern.
Subjects in the control condition were informed that,
in accordance with departmental regulations,

they would

receive three points for participating in the experiment.
Thus these subjects did not draw to determine the reward
although the E did allow them to decide who would serve
as the first actor by having one of them toss a coin in
the same manner as the other subjects.

No mention of any

future competition for the left over $100.00 was made to
the control subjects.
All subjects,

in both control and experimental con

ditions, were informed that once the experiment began
there was to be no communication between them until the
experiment was completed.
Upon completion of the above briefing,

subjects were

given the opportunity to ask for clarification of any
aspects of the experiment about which they were uncertain.
When the E was satisfied that the subjects understood
what was required of them they were seated before their
respective actor/observer consoles facing the screen upon
which the experimental problems were to be presented.
After reminding the actor to answer each problem and
activating the slide projector which automatically
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presented them the E then stood in the background while
the subject solved the problems.
When the time required for the presentation of the
30 problems had elapsed,

the E returned and escorted the

subjects to two separate rooms where they completed the
questionnaires which served as the dependent measures.
The E told each subject to answer each question and that
their responses would remain anonymous.
When the subjects had completed the questionnaires
they switched roles so that the person who had been the
actor now served as the observer and vice-versa.

Once

the dependent measures were collected for the second run
the E informed the subjects that the experiment was over.
They were then thanked for their cooperation and told that
a group debriefing for all subjects would take place at
a later date in order to inform them of the findings.

Experimental Design
A multivariate analysis was initially conducted to
allow a number of ad hoc comparisons to be examined by
use of individual analyses of variance.

The effects of

the four variables upon the attribution process were then
further analyzed using a 2 (role-actor or observer)
(future interaction/no future interaction)

by 2

by 2 feedback

patterns of correct responses- ascending or descending)
by 3 (reward, high, low, standard)

factorial design.

Specific orthogonal comparisons and D u n c a n ’s Multiple

Range tests were then made to test the hypotheses.

RESULTS

A total of 11 dependent variables were analyzed in
order to investigate the experimental hypotheses.

These

dependent variables assessed the subjects' attributions
of:

1) responsibility for reward outcomes

A, items 1 and 5),
subject

(See Appendix

2) attractiveness of the other

(See Appendix A f item 3),

3) ability

(See

Appendix A, item 7),

4) effort

5) problem difficulty

(See Appendix A, items 8 and 9),

6) performance

(See Appendix A, item 11),

(See Appendix A, items 2 and 6), and

the influence of luck on performance

7)

(See Appendix A,

items 4 and 10).
A multivariate analysis of variance was performed to
determine if there were any overall significant treatment
effects on the s u b j e c t s ’ attribution processes.

This

analysis, using the Hotelli n g - L a w l e y ’s Trace criteria,
indicated an overall main effect for:

Future Interaction,

F (11 and 132) = 2.66, p=.004, Feedback F(ll and 132)=8.33,
p=.001, and Reward, F(ll and 132)=2.73, p=.004.

An overall

Interaction by Reward effect, F (11 and 132)=2.56, p = . 006
and Time by Role effect, F(ll and 132)=1.94, p=.039 were
also found.

Based on the results of the MANOVA, uni

variate analyses were conducted to determine the in
fluence of the various experimental treatments on the
dependent measures.
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The hypothesis

(la) that,

in situations wherein re

ward was not manipulated and subjects were not told that
they would be working together on a similar task in the
future,

actors would tend to make external attributions to

explain their behavior whereas observers would tend to
explain that same behavior by making internal disposi
tional attributions to the actor was not supported.
Specific Duncan's Multiple Range comparisons for each
of the nine dependent measures presented in Table 1
between actors and observers serving in their roles for
the first time under identical future interaction and re
ward conditions relevant to this hypothesis,
reward-no future interaction,

i.e. standard

indicated no statistically

significant differences between actors and observers in
terms of the externality-internality of their attributions.
As a further test of the externality-internality of
actor/observer attributions a chi square analysis of the
subjects'

perception of problem difficulty fluctuation

(See Appendix A, item 8) was conducted in order to deter
mine whether any of the experimental manipulations
resulted in changes in the subjects'

attributions of the

difficulty level of the problems.
A significant chi
2
square for feedback (X =54.35, p=.001) indicated that
subjects,

regardless of role, made attributions of

problem difficulty fluctuation based upon feedback.
Ascending subjects perceived the first half of the
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TABLE 1
MEAN ATTRIBUTION SCORES OF FIRST ORDER ACTORS AND OBSERVERS
FOR THE STANDARD REWARD-NO FUTURE INTERACTION CONDITION

dependent measures

actors

observers

14.13

14.62

liking for other subject

4.58

4.78

lucky guesses

4.92

5.88

17.06

16.13

ability

4.43

4.63

difficulty of first half

6.67

6.75

difficulty of second half

6.82

6.87

unlucky guesses

7.85

8.83

86.16

87.25

number correct

expected number correct

effort
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problems as most difficult while descending subjects con
sidered the second portion of the problems most difficult.
The data for this analysis is presented in Table 2.

A

significant feedback by future consequences chi square
(X2=61.77, p = . 0001)

indicated that the effect of feedback

on perception of problem difficulty exerted itself re
gardless of whether or not subjects anticipated future
interaction
square
square

(See Figure 1).

(X2= 6 5 .69, p = . 0001)
2
(X =66.99, p=.0001)

The feedback by reward chi
and the feedback by role chi
indicated that regardless of

role or reward received for performing the experiment,
subjects who received an ascending pattern of feedback
perceived the first portion of the problems as more
difficult than the second portion while those who received
descending feedback perceived problem difficulty in a
reverse fashion

(See Figures 2 and 3).

Of the twelve chi

square analyses performed only those involving feedback
were significant in terms of altering the s u b j e c t s ' per
ceptions of problem difficulty.

Thus,

the determining

influence upon attributions of problem difficulty was the
feedback pattern which subjects, regardless of role,
received.
The hypothesis

(lb) that when situational factors

such as high reward are combined w i t h ascending feedback
patterns of success, attributions of actors will be more
internal than when such situational factors are not
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TABLE 2
FREQUENCY OF ASCENDING AND DESCENDING SUBJECTS'
ATTRIBUTIONS OF PROBLEM DIFFICULTY

attributions
of difficulty

ascending
feedback

descending
feedback

most difficult problems
were located in first half

52

12

all problems were of
equal difficulty

23

21

most difficult problems
were located in second half

15

60
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FI,ds

13 5
FI, as

Problem Difficulty
Fig. 1. Feedback x future interaction chi square for
perception of problem difficulty.

1 = most difficult problems were located in first half
3 = all problems were of equal difficulty
5 = most difficult problems were located in second half
NFI = no future interaction
FI = future interaction
ds = descending feedback
as = ascending feedback
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Problem Difficulty
Fig.

2.

Feedback x reward chi square for perception
of problem difficulty.

1 = most difficult problems were located in first half
3 = all problems were of equal difficulty
5 = most difficult problems were located in second half
As = ascending feedback
Ds = descending feedback
LO = low reward
St = standard reward
Hi = high reward
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O b s ,As

1 3 5
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Problem Difficulty

Fig. 3.

Feedback x role chi square for perception of
problem difficulty.

1 = most difficult problems were located in first half
3 = all problems were of equal difficulty
5 = most difficult problems were located in second half
As = ascending feedback
Ds = descending feedback
Act = actor
Obs = observer
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manipulated, was not supported.

The mean attribution

scores of actors in these conditions are presented in
Table 3.

Orthogonal comparisons for each of the nine

dependent measures shown in Table 3 between attributions
made by actors in high and standard reward conditions
under ascending feedback and no future interaction yielded
no significance for any of the dependent m e a s u r e s .
The hypothesis

(Ic) that first and second order

actors and first and second order observers should
demonstrate similar attributions under the same experi
mental conditions was only partially supported.

Order,

i.e. whether a subject was in a particular role first or
second was identified as exerting a main effect on attri
butions of performance,

i.e. how many problems the subject

was perceived to have solved correctly
item 2).

Thus first order subjects

(See Appendix A,

(X=14.38)

tended to

make attributions of poorer performance than did second
order subjects

(X=15.66), F (1,106)=6.70, p=.05.

A sig

nificant order by role interaction, F (1,106)=8.12, p= . 01,
was also obtained for attributions of how well the subject
would perform if he were given another attempt at a
different set of similar problems

(see Figure 4).

An

orthogonal comparison between observers indicated that the
first order observers expected the actors to solve fewer
problems currently on a future attempt

(See Appendix A,

item 6) than did second order o b s e r v e r s , F (1, 106)=9.94,
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TABLE 3
ACTOR'S MEAN ATTRIBUTION SCORES UNDER HIGH AND STANDARD
REWARD FOR ASCENDING FEEDBACK AND NO FUTURE INTERACTION

reward
dependent measures

high

standard

number correct

12.4

13.8

liking for
other subject

4.7

4.6

lucky guesses

3.9

4.9

15.2

16.6

ability

4.7

4.1

difficulty of
first half

7.1

7.0

difficulty of
second half

5.4

6.8

unlucky guesses

10.4

7.9

effort expended

86.5

84.5

expected number
correct
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20 -I

Time 2

Expected number of correct
responses on a future attempt

19 -

18 -

16

Time 1

15 -

Observer

Actor
Role

Fig. 4

Time x role interaction for expected future
performance.
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p = . 01.

Aside from these exceptions, all other dependent

measures employed in the study indicated no influence of
order on the s ubjects 1 attribution proce s s e s .
The hypothesis

(Ila) that w hen both subjects inter

act in producing an outcome

(high/low)

r e w a r d , respon

sibility for positive o u t c o m e s , i.e. high r e w a r d , will be
attributed primarily to oneself by both subjects whereas
negative,

low rewa r d , outcomes will be attributed to the

other person was not confirmed.

Contrary to expectation,

subjects did not differ significantly in their respon
sibility attributions as a function of reward on either
of the two dependent measures

(See Appendix A, items 1

and 5) used to assess attributions of responsibility for
reward outcomes.

Mean attribution scores of subjects in

high and low reward conditions for responsibility for
reward outcomes are presented in Table 4.
Although the hypothesis concerning responsibility
attributions for reward outcomes did not contain any pre
diction regarding the effects of future interaction on
the subjects attributions of responsibility, a significant
main effect F (1,72)=5.20, p = .05, was obtained for the
influence of future interaction on attributions of
responsibility for reward outcome than when no future
interaction was anticipated.

A pronounced trend was also

observed in the data for subjects to attribute more
responsibility to themselves when a low reward was re
ceived in the no future interaction condition and to
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TABLE 4
I*

MEAN ATTRIBUTIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY TO SELF AND OTHERS
FOR REWARD OUTCOME

attributions
of
responsibility

High

to self

42.75

50.62

to other
subject

45.13

36.19

Reward
Low
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attribute more responsibility to the other subject when a
high reward was received in the future interaction condi
tion

(See Table 5).

It was also found that attribution of

responsibility for reward outcomes to the other subject
(See Appendix A, item 5) was positively correlated

(p=.01)

with his expected performance on a future attempt at the
task

(See Appendix A, item 6).

That i s , the more the

other subject was seen as responsible for the reward out
come, the better he was expected to do in a future
performance of the task.
The hypothesis

(IIa2) that both actors and observers

would make more positive attributions, other than for
responsibility,
supported.

under high reward conditions was partially

It was expected that high reward subjects

would make attributions of more ability, more effort,
better performance,

and better future performance than

would subjects who received a low r e w a r d .

Mean attribu

tion scores relevant to this hypothesis are presented in
Table 6.

Main effects for reward were obtained for

attributions of performance

(See Appendix A, item 2)

F (2,108)=4.73, p=.05, ability
F (2,108)=3.40,

(See Appendix A, item 7)

p=.05, good luck,

(See Appendix A, item 4)

F (2,108)=7.37, p = .01, and unlucky guesses
item 10) F(2,108)=3.86, p = . 05.

(See Appendix A,

Thus subjects, regardless

of r o l e , made attributions of better performance,

higher

ability, more good luck, and more unlucky guesses when

TABLE 5

MEAN ATTRIBUTIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY TO SELF AND OTHERS
FOR REWARD OUTCOME BY SUBJECTS IN FUTURE INTERACTION
AND NO FUTURE INTERACTION CONDITIONS

attributions
responsibility

no future interaction
high reward

low reward

future interaction
high reward

low reward

to self

40.50

57.00

45.00

44.25

to other
subject

37.75

32.88

52.50

39.50
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TABLE 6
MEAN ATTRIBUTION SCORES OF SUBJECTS UNDER
HIGH AND LOW REWARD CONDITIONS

Reward
dependent measures

high

number correct

15.26

14.15

liking for
other subject

4.80

4.63

lucky guesses

5.84

4.33

17.53

16.80

ability

4.70

4.43

difficulty of
first half

6.74

6.75

difficulty of
second half

6.78

6.63

unlucky guesses

9.16

7.28

effort expended

87.81

87.81

expected number
correct

low
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they participated under high reward than when they did
so under low reward conditions.

Although, contrary to

expectation, no main effect for reward on effort expended
was obtained, a significant interaction was found between
reward and future interaction F(2,108)=3.48, p=.05 (See
Figure 5).

Thus when subjects, regardless of role,

received a low reward they made attributions of greater
effort, F (1,108)=11.51, p=.01, when they expected to be
working together as a team competing on a similar task
for a large financial reward in the future than when they
did not have this expectation of future interaction.

A

significant reward by future consequences interaction,
F (2,108)=4.26, p=.0 5, was also obtained for attributions
of unlucky guesses (See Figure 6).

An orthogonal compari

son indicated that subjects, regardless of role, who did
not anticipate future interaction made attributions of
significantly fewer unlucky guesses under low reward than
they did under high reward conditions, F(l,108)=13.49,
p=.001.

On the other hand, subjects who expected future

interaction did not differ in terms of their attributions
of unlucky guesses as a function of reward.
The hypothesis (Ilbl) that an ascending pattern of
success would be perceived by observers as indicative of
lower ability and poorer performance on the part of the
actor than similar attributions made by observers
witnessing a descending pattern of successes was supported
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(See Table 7).

Orthogonal comparisons were made between

attributions of observers under descending and ascending
feedback conditions for all dependent variables presented
in Table 7.

These comparisons indicated that descending

observers attributed better performance (See Appendix A,
item 2), F (1,108)=21.6, p=.001, and more ability,
F( 1,108)=12.27, p=.001, to the actors than did ascending
observers.

The descending observers also expected the

actors to correctly solve more problems on a future
attempt (See Appendix A, item 6), F(l,108)=10.73, p=.01.
No significant differences were found, however, for the
observers1 attributions of effort or luck as a function
of feedback.
Orthogonal comparisons for the six dependent measures
presented in Table 8 further indicated that when observers
witnessed a descending pattern of feedback and did not
expect to interact with the actor in performing a similar
task at a future time, they attributed better performance,
i.e. a larger number of correct responses, to the actor,
F(l,108)=4.61, p = .05, than when they witnessed an ascend
ing pattern of feedback under the same future interaction
condition.

None of the other five comparisons yielded

significant differences between attributions of ascending
and descending observers in the no future interaction
condition.
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TABLE 3

OBSERVERS' MEAN ATTRIBUTION SCORES UNDER
ASCENDING AND DESCENDING FEEDBACK

dependent
measures

number correct

Ascending

Descending

13.72

16.97

5.55

6.08

16.08

18.75

ability

4.43

4.90

unlucky guesses

9.00

7.53

effort expended

85.67

89.17

lucky guesses
expected number correct
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TABLE 8

OBSERVER'S ASCENDING AND DESCENDING MEAN ATTRIBUTION SCORES
UNDER THE NO FUTURE INTERACTION CONDITION

feedback

dependent measures
ascending

number correct

descending

13.50

15.63

4.97

5.80

15.70

16.80

ability

4.40

4.57

unlucky guesses

8.90

8.80

effort expended

83.83

86.17

lucky guesses
expected number
correct
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Since a main effect for order was obtained for per
formance attributions (See Appendix A, item 2), as in
dicated earlier, ascending observers were compared on the
basis of order for each of the six reward-interaction
treatment conditions using the Duncan's Multiple Range
test.

None of these comparisons indicated that performance

attributions of observers were affected by order since no
significant differences were obtained.
In order to assess the effects of the feedback
manipulation on observers in the same way as had been
done in the earlier Jones, et al. (1968) study, the
attributions of first order observers under the control
condition were also compared by means of the Duncan1s
Multiple Range test for each of the nine dependent
variables listed in Table 9.

In this pure test, observers

attributed better performance to the descending actors
than to the ascending actors (Diff=5.8, p=.01) and they
expected the descending actors to correctly solve more
problems on a future attempt (See Appendix A, item 6),
Diff=8.4, p=.01, although they did not attribute more
ability to the descending actors (See Appendix A, item 7).
The means relevant to these comparisons are presented in
Table 9.
The hypothesis (IIb2) that actors experiencing an
ascending pattern of feedback would attribute higher
ability and better performance to themselves than actors
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TABLE 9
MEAN ATTRIBUTION SCORES OF FIRST ORDER OBSERVERS UNDER
ASCENDING AND DESCENDING FEEDBACK IN THE STANDARD
REWARD-NO FUTURE INTERACTION (CONTROL) CONDITION

feedback

dependent measures
ascending

descending

13.40

16.70

liking for
other subject

4.60

5.10

lucky guesses

3.90

5.90

14.40

19.50

ability

4.40

4.80

difficulty of
first half

6.00

6.10

difficulty of
second half

5.90

7.50

unlucky guesses

7.90

8.80

80.00

87.00

number correct

expected number
correct

effort
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experiencing a descending pattern of success was not
supported.

Instead, the opposite occurred such that the

attributions of actors were affected by the feedback in
the same fashion as were those of observers.

Orthogonal

comparisons were made between attributions of actors
under descending patterns of feedback across all other
conditions for the six dependent variables presented in
Table 10.

These comparisons indicated that actors

witnessing descending patterns of feedback attributed a
higher degree of ability (See Appendix A, item 7) to
themselves than did actors who received an ascending
pattern of feedback, P (1,108)=6.42, p = .05, just as the
observers had done.

The descending actors also favorably

distorted their performance (See Appendix A, item 2),
F (1,108)=35.51, p=.001, attributed more good luck (See
Appendix A, item 4) to themselves, F (1,108)=25.06, p=.001,
and expected to solve more problems correctly on a future
attempt (See Appendix A, item 6), F(l,108)=4.45, p=.05,
than did actors who received an ascending pattern of
feedback.
Like the observers, actors who did not expect to
interact with the other subject in solving similar prob
lems at some future time attributed a greater number of
correct responses to themselves when they experienced
descending feedback, F (1,108)=11.75, p=.001, although
they did not perceive themselves as having significantly
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TABLE 10
ACTORS' MEAN ATTRIBUTION SCORES UNDER
ASCENDING AND DESCENDING FEEDBACK

dependent measures

number correct

ascending

descending

12.60

16.78

3.58

6.60

15.85

17.57

ability

4.23

4.57

unlucky guesses

8.77

7.43

effort expended

88.83

lucky guesses
expected number correct

86.00
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greater ability under this type of feedback.

When such

descending actors expected to interact with the other
subject at some future time in solving similar problems
they not only attributed better performance (See Appendix
A, item 2) to themselves, F (1,108)=25.10, p=.001, but
also perceived themselves as making more lucky guesses
(See Appendix A, item 4), F (1,108)=29.58, p=.001, and as
possessing greater ability for solving such problems,
F (1,108)=4.44, p=.05 (See Table 11).
The hypothesis (lie) that the prospect of future
interaction for the purpose of gaining a large financial
reward would influence observers, motivated by self
interest, to emphasize situational factors in making
causal attributions to explain the actors' behavior when
that behavior was perceived as poor, i.e. under ascending
feedback and to emphasize internal factors when the actors'
performances were perceived as positive, i.e. under
descending feedback, was supported (See Table 12).

When

observers witnessed a descending pattern of feedback and
expected to interact with the actor at a future time in
performing a similar task, they not only perceived his
performance (See Appendix A, item 2) as significantly
better, F(l,108)=19.41, p=.001, than that of ascending
actors but also expected the descending actors to get
significantly more problems correct on their next attempt
(See Appendix A, item 6), F (1,108)=13.47, p=.001,
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TABLE 11
ACTORS' ASCENDING AND DESCENDING MEAN ATTRIBUTION SCORES
UNDER FUTURE INTERACTION AND NO FUTURE INTERACTION

dependent
measures

number
correct

future interaction
descend
ascend

no
future interaction
descend
ascend

12.60

17.57

12.60

16.00

3.33

7.97

3.83

5.23

16.00

18^27

15.70

16.87

ability

4.20

4.60

4.27

4.53

unlucky guesses

9.33

7.67

8.20

7.20

effort expended

92.83

87.67

84.83

84.33

lucky guesses
expected
number correct
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TABLE 12
OBSERVER'S ASCENDING AND DESCENDING MEAN ATTRIBUTION
SCORES UNDER THE FUTURE INTERACTION CONDITION

dependent measures

asdending

descending

13.93

18.30

6.13

6.37

16.47

20.70

ability

4.47

5.23

unlucky guesses

9.10

6.27

effort expended

87.50

92.17

number correct
lucky guesses
expected number
correct

perceived them as having greater ability, F (1,108)=
16.04, p=.001, and attributed significantly fewer un
lucky guesses (See Appendix A, item 10), F(1,1Q8)=6.

DISCUSSION

Three major findings emerged from the present experi
ment.

The results indicated that when subjects are con

fronted with novel situations involving tasks with which
they have had little or no previous experience, their
attributions will be influenced by a primacy effect,
regardless of whether they actually performed the task or
merely observed another's performance.
The second major finding of the present experiment
was that when a person willingly engages in an activity
which he knows beforehand may result in negative con
sequences to himself and he believes that he is capable
of exerting control over the outcome, he will acknowledge
responsibility for the negative outcome.
The third major finding was that self interest affects
the directionality of observer's attributions.

When it

was in the observer's self interest to attribute the
actor's performance to internal dispositional factors,
i.e. when the actor received a descending pattern of
feedback and the observer expected to work with him in
solving similar problems in the future for a large
financial reward the actor's behavior was attributed to
internal factors.

When it was not in the observer's self

interest to attribute the actor's performance to internal
characteristics, i.e. when the actor received an ascending
62
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pattern of feedback in the future interaction condition,
the observers attributed the actor's performance to ex
ternal factors such as bad luck.
The first major finding of the present experiment was
derived from the results obtained concerning the effects
of feedback on attributions of performance and ability
made by both actors and observers which indicated that a
primacy effect occurred across roles.

Jones, et a l .

(1968) reported a primacy effect for observers' attribu
tions of performance and ability, and a recency effect
for performance attributions made by actors witnessing
their own behavior.

It is suggested that the primacy

effect obtained for actors in the present study was a
function of the fact that the actors in this study, as
compared to those in the earlier study, had little
knowledge of their relative ability prior to performing
the task.

In the Jones, et al. (1968) study the observers

knew that the actors had previously solved five more
problems than they and the actor subjects were informed
that they had solved five more problems correctly than
the observer.

In the present experiment such definite

information was not possessed by either actors or ob
servers.

First order subjects, regardless of role, had no

information regarding relative ability and performance.
Second order subjects had only a vague idea based on
their observations of performance, their own or the other
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subject's, during the first session of problem solving.
As indicated earlier, first order subjects, regardless of
role, tended to make lower performance attributions than
did second order subjects.

This was apparently due to a

combination of the information they had about the nature
of the problems, i.e. they were specifically designed for
the very brightest people in the population, which had a
depressor effect on their initial attributions of per
formance, and the cueing effect of the first questionnaire
which caused the second order subjects to be more accurate,
and thereby higher, in their performance attributions.
Hovland has suggested that the nearer one comes to
achieving primacy in the sense of the first presentation
of unfamiliar material, the more apt one is to obtain
primacy effects.

In the present study such a situation

was closely approximated with respect to the subjects1
expectations of performance prior to actually attempting
to solve the problems.

It is likely, that due to the

description of the problems, i.e. designed to assess
intelligence levels of extremely bright people, and the
instructions:

"so don't be concerned if you don't get a

large number correct", the subjects' performance expecta
tions would be slightly pessimistic.

This expectation,

coupled with a lack of familiarity with problems of this
type and the absence of any accurate standard of
comparison for performance, resulted in a situation
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wherein the subjects, regardless of role, were susceptible
to a primacy effect resulting from the feedback.

This is

particularly so for the "ascending actor" who doesn1t
expect to do too well, is unfamiliar with this type of
problem, and who lacks an accurate standard against which
to compare his performance.

Such an actor initially en

counters a sequence of failures which, as the data
indicates, exercises a determining influence on his
attributions of performance.
Extending this line of reasoning as an explanation
of the obtained primacy effect for performance attribu
tions of ascending actors, one would expect that first
order ascending actors would make lower performance
attributions than second order ascending actors since the
first order subjects lack even the vague standard of
comparison which is available to those in the second order.
A series of comparisons between first and second order
ascending actors, using Duncan's Multiple Range test,
indicated that such actors in the standard reward-no
future interaction condition differed significantly in
their attributions of performance.

The same result was

obtained when first and second order actors in the low
reward-no future interaction condition were compared on
attributions of performance.

In both cases the perform

ance attributions of first order actors were significantly
lower than those of second order actors.

The finding

66

that the low reward ascending actors were the only treat
ment group of ascending actors, in the no future inter
action condition, other than those in the standard reward
condition, to demonstrate significantly lower first order
attributions of performance makes sense insofar as they
not only lacked a standard of comparison, but also, as a
function of low reward, had even lower performance ex
pectations than those in the standard reward condition.
All other comparisons of first and second order ascending
actors under the same interaction conditions resulted in
no significant differences between performance attribu
tions , indicating that other factors, e.g. future inter
action and/or high reward, were exerting "positive" in
fluence on first order performance attributions.
Although the finding of a primacy as opposed to a
recency effect for ascending actors' attributions of
performance is the opposite of that obtained by Jones,
et a l . (1968), it is consistent with findings reported by
Langer and Roth (1975).

These investigators had actor and

observer subjects engage in a coin tossing task and
attempt to predict the results, i.e. heads or tails.
Subjects either flipped the coin (actors) or watched
another subject flip the coin (observers) and attempted
to predict the outcome.

Subjects were given the same

feedback conditions, descending, ascending, or random,
as had been used in the Jones, et al.

(1968) study.

As
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in the present study, and unlike the Jones, et al. (1968)
study, the subjects lacked a standard of performance
comparison.

Langer and Roth (1975) found that both actors

and observers in the descending condition perceived
themselves as better at the task, remembered more successes,
and predicted better performance on future attempts.
These investigators concluded that:

"... a skill attribu

tion is determined early in a sequence of outcomes.

After

the attribution is made, outcomes inconsistent with it are
not given much weight.

An early, fairly consistent

pattern of successes leads to a skill attribution..."
(Langer and Roth, 1975, p. 954).
The second major finding of the present experiment
was based upon the total lack of support for the hypothe
sis that when both subjects interact in producing an out
come, responsibility for that outcome will be attributed
primarily to oneself when the outcome is positive (high
reward) and to the other subject when the outcome is
negative (low reward).

Subjects1 self attributions of

responsibility for outcome were not affected by the
positive or negative nature of that outcome.

This finding

is contrary to the self interest, or "self serving"
position which maintains that it is ego enhancing to see
oneself as responsible for pleasant things and ego
threatening to see oneself as responsible for unpleasant
things.

This self serving hypothesis had been supported
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in a recent experiment by Harris and Harvey (1975, upon
which the present hypothesis was based.

These investi

gators had subjects decide which of two tasks, concerning
which they had only ambiguous descriptive information,
another person would perform at a later time.

After the

decision was made subjects were then given additional in
formation about the nature of the tasks.

Half the

subjects were led to believe that the task was actually
very pleasant while others learned that it was extremely
unpleasant.

Subjects in the pleasant condition attributed

a high amount of responsibility for the decision to them
selves whereas those in the unpleasant condition attri
buted a relatively low amount of responsibility to them
selves .
The different methodology of the present experiment
with respect to the subject's active involvement in deter
mining the reward and his prior knowledge regarding the
foreseeability of the possibility of negative consequences,
i.e. getting a low reward, provides a ready explanation
of the results obtained with respect to subjects' attri
butions of responsibility.

Kelley (1967) has proposed

that a person will take responsibility for negative con
sequences in situations where he considers himself
instrumental in having brought them about.

According to

Brehm and Jones (1970) and Cooper (1971) a person will
accept responsibility for negative consequences when he
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knew of the possibility of such consequences prior to
making the decision.

Such conditions were fulfilled in

the present experiment.

The subjects had prior knowledge

of the possibility of negative consequences, i.e. drawing
a "one", and were instrumental in determining the reward.
An investigation of determinants of perceived con
trol (Wortman, 1975) which employed a method of assigning
attractive or unattractive consequences that was similar
to the method of determining reward outcomes in the present
experiment yielded results which are almost identical to
those obtained in the present study.

Wortman (1975)

showed subjects eight consumer items which they rated for
attractiveness.

Subjects were then allowed to draw one

of two different colored marbles from a can in order to
win one of the two items, the one they had rated most
attractive and the one they had rated least attractive.
Subjects were informed before the drawing that if they
drew a blue marble they would receive a certain item,
e.g. the one they had rated most attractive, and if they
drew a red marble they would get the other.

In other

words the subjects had prior knowledge of the possible
consequences of their action.

The finding of importance

with respect to the present experiment is that the
subjects who had this prior knowledge did not differ
significantly in their attributions of responsibility as
a function of the attractiveness of the outcome.

As a
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matter of interest, the low attractive outcome subjects
tended to attribute more responsibility to themselves,
although not significantly so, than did those whose
actions resulted in receipt of the highly attractive out
come.

These results are nearly identical to those ob

tained in the present experiment in which low reward
subjects in the no future interaction condition tended to
attribute more responsibility to themselves than did high
reward subjects.

The reversal of this trend under future

interaction conditions suggests a motivation on the part
of the subjects to make a good impression by attributing
greater responsibility for the positive outcome and less
responsibility for the negative outcome to the other sub
ject whom they expect will be their partner in a future
endeavor.

Such a responsibility allocation in the future

interaction condition is also consistent with the subject1s
self interest insofar as the correlation between the
dependent measures of "responsibility of other for out
come" and expected future performance was highly sig
nificant in a positive direction.

Thus the more subjects

perceived the other person as responsible for the out
come, the better they expected him to perform at the task
in the future.

Needless to say, the better their partner

was expected to do, the better their chances of winning
the fifty dollar prize.

Thus the future interaction con

dition employed in the present experiment may be con
sidered to have activated a double edged self interest
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motive, i.e. the desire to be perceived in a positive
light and the desire to perceive the other person as one
who would perform successfully when such a performance
meant financial gain for the attributor.
The third major finding of the experiment was based
upon the hypothesis that the prospect of future inter
action for the purpose of gaining a large financial reward
would influence observers to make internal attributions
when they perceived the actors ' performances as 11good"
and to emphasize external situational factors when they
perceived the behavior as "poor".
supported.

This hypothesis was

When observers who expected future inter

action with the other subject for monetary gain witnessed
a performance which they perceived as good, i.e.
descending feedback, they favorably distorted performance,
attributed more ability to the actor, and expected him to
solve more problems correctly on the next attempt than
when such future interaction observers witnessed a "poor"
performance, i.e. ascending feedback.

Thus it seems that

the future interaction condition aroused observers' self
interest which in turn influenced their attributions in
a manner that increased their chances of winning the
fifty dollars.

Such a conclusion seems further warranted

by the finding that observers who perceived a positive
performance in the future interaction condition expected
the actor to solve more problems correctly on the next
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attempt than did observers who witnessed the same positive
performance in the no future interaction condition.
The other aspect of this hypothesis was that when
future interaction observers perceived a poor performance,
i.e. ascending feedback, they would emphasize situational
factors to explain that performance.
hypothesis was also supported.

This portion of the

Observers in the future

interaction condition who witnessed an actor receive an
ascending pattern of feedback attributed the actor's
"poor” performance to bad luck.

Thus the interpretation

was that the actor1s performance was not due to a lack
of ability, but rather to an external factor, bad luck.
The observer's self interest apparently was served since
the actor, the observer's future partner, was not lacking
in ability at the task, he merely was unlucky on his
first attempt at the task.
The results of the present experiment also suggested
that when their self interest was not involved, observers
witnessing another person performing a task require some
standard of comparison to serve as a basis for attributing
ability at that task to the other person.

In the absence

of such a standard, observers who are requested to make
attributions regarding the performer's ability at the
task will tend to make moderate rather than extreme
ability attributions.
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This suggested interpretation was based upon the
results obtained from tests of several of the experimental
hypotheses.

The hypothesis that under standard reward-no

future interaction conditions actors would explain their
behavior by external attributions whereas observers would
explain this same behavior by internal dispositional
attributions was not supported.

This hypothesis was

based upon the theoretical position of Jones and Nisbett
(1972) which maintains that "...there is a pervasive
tendency for actors to attribute their actions to situa
tional factors whereas observers tend to attribute them
to stable personal dispositions" (p. 80).

Results con

sistent with this position have been reported by Jones
and Harris (1967) with respect to observers attributions
of essay writers' attitudes and by Jones, et al. (1968)
for causal attributions of performance on a difficult
intellectual task.
The standard reward-no future interaction condition
of the present experiment was intended as a replication
of the earlier Jones, et al. (1968) experiment insofar
as the nature of the task, patterns of feedback, and
subjects' anticipation of future interaction for the
possibility of gaining a financial reward were essentially
identical in both experiments.

Jones, et al.

(1968)

found that observer subjects in the descending success
conditions rated their actors as more intelligent than
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they did actors in the ascending feedback condition.

The

observers also predicted that the descending actors would
perform better on a future similar task and favorably
distorted recall of the descending actors9 performances.
In their sixth experiment of the series, Jones, et al.
(1968) again had a subject and a confederate simultaneously
solve the problems.

This time, however, the subjects

learned that the accomplice had correctly solved ten of
the thirty items whereas he had solved 15 items in either
a random, ascending, or descending pattern of success.
The subjects in this case predicted better future per
formance for themselves when they received an ascending
as opposed to a random or descending pattern of feedback.
Ascending subjects also reported that the items in the
latter portion of the series were of less difficulty than
those in the initial portion.

Conversely, subjects who

received descending feedback indicated that the latter
items were more difficult than the initial ones.
Based on the findings of the Jones, et al. (1968)
study it was predicted that in the present experiment
comparisons of actor and observer attributions under the
standard reward-no future interaction condition should
yield differences in the directionality of attributions.
Actors should, it was hypothesized, make external situa
tional attributions to explain the same behavior under the
same conditions.

Thus comparisons were made between the
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attributions of actors and those of observers in the
standard reward, no future interaction condition to test
this hypothesis.

No significant differences were found

between the attributions of actors and observers under
these conditions and thus the hypothesis was not supported.
It is important to note that the results reported by
Jones et a l . (1968) with respect to the divergent attribu
tions of actors and observers were based on a series of
six experiments in which comparisons were never directly
made between the attributions of actors and observers.
Instead, the first five experiments compared observers'
attributions under ascending feedback against observers'
attributions under descending feedback.
When these same comparisons, i.e. observers under
ascending feedback versus observers under descending
feedback, were made using a Duncan's multiple Range test,
in the standard reward-no future interaction condition of
the present experiment, descending observers favorably
distorted the actor's performance and expected that the
actor would get more correct on a future attempt than did
ascending observers, although they did not attribute more
ability to the descending actors.
One other aspect of the Jones, et al. (1968) experi
ment seems worthy of mention at this point.

In the first

five experiments of the earlier study both subjects, one
of whom was a confederate, simultaneously performed the
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problem solving task, after which the observer subjects
were informed that the other "subject” had solved 15 of
the 30 problems correctly and that they had correctly
solved only ten of the problems.

Thus, a standard of

comparison was established, i.e. the observer subjects
believed that the other person had correctly answered
five more problems, roughly 17% of the total number, than
they had.

The observer subjects than attributed more

ability and better future performance to descending than
to ascending "subjects".

They also favorably distorted

their recall of the number of correct responses made by
descending "subjects".
As was indicated earlier, a significant main effect
for order was obtained for the dependent measure "How
many problems did the other subject solve correctly?" and
a significant order by role interaction was found for "How
many problems would you expect the other subject to answer
correctly if he had the opportunity to take another test
composed of similar items of comparable difficulty?"

In

the present experiment subjects did not simultaneously
respond to the problems.

Instead, one served as an ob

server while the other solved the problems.

First order

subjects therefore had no information upon which to form
a personal standard of comparison as did the subjects in
the Jones, et a l . (1968) study.

All that first order

subjects knew was that the problems had been developed
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for the express purpose of assessing intelligence in the
highest intellectual segment of the population.

Thus

while the descending feedback pattern had essentially the
same effect on attributions of first order observer sub
jects in the present experiment as it did in the Jones,
et al. (1968) study, i.e. under descending feedback ob
servers favorably distorted performance and expected the
actor to perform better on a future attempt, it did not
affect their attributions of ability.
Despite the fact that they favorably distorted his
performance under descending feedback and expected better
future performance for descending than for ascending
actors, first order observers were apparently unable to
interpret the meaning of the actors * scores in terms of a
relative level of ability since they had no standard against
which to make a comparison.

Thus it is suggested that

attributions of ability require some standard against
which performance can be measured.

According to Jones

and Nisbett (1972) the observer compares the actor with
other actors and judges his attributes accordingly.

In

the present experiment, first order observers in the
standard reward-no future interaction lacked such a
standard by which to assess the actor's ability.
Technically, second order observers had such a
standard of comparison in the sense that they were aware
of both their own performance and that of the second
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order actor.

However, it is logical to conclude that, by

virtue of having completed the initial questionnaire, the
second order observers had been cued to attend to the
number of correct responses made by the second order
actor.

This assumption is supported by the fact that

first order observers * mean attributions of the actors'
performances differed by +3.2 for the descending feedback
and by -2.6 for ascending feedback whereas second order
observers differed by only +.2 for descending feedback
and by -.6 for ascending feedback from the actual number
of correct responses, which was 15 in both feedback con
ditions.

This cueing reduced the influence of feedback

patterns on atrributions of performance, since second
order observers attended more closely to the number of
correct responses, and by virtue of the high positive
correlation (p=.0001) between performance and expected
future performance eradicated the difference obtained in
the first order attributions.
Another finding which suggested the importance of
the social comparison factor was the result obtained
from testing the hypothesis that actors who received an
ascending pattern of feedback would attribute higher
ability and better performance to themselves than actors
who received a descending pattern of success.
hypothesis was not supported.

This

All subjects regardless of

role made attributions of better performance and higher
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ability under descending feedback conditions.

Although

the overall results indicated that feedback exerted a
positive influence on attributions of ability, it is of
interest that under the no future interaction conditions,
actors attributed better performance to themselves under
descending feedback although they did not differ in
attributions of ability or expected future performance as
a function of feedback.

When they anticipated future

interaction with the other subject for the purpose of ob
taining a large financial reward, however, descending
actors favorably distorted their performance, perceived
themselves as making more lucky guesses, and considered
themselves to have more ability at the task than did
ascending actors.

The fact that the descending actors

made more favorable attributions under the future inter
action condition appears to be a function of self
interest.

The more ability and good luck they possess,

the better is their chance to win the money.
The suggested importance of the social comparison
process was also based on the results obtained for the
hypothesis that an ascending pattern of success would be
perceived by observers as indicative of lower ability and
poorer performance on the part of the actor than similar
attributions made by observers witnessing a descending
pattern of successes.

This hypothesis was supported.

Overall, observers witnessing a descending pattern of
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feedback attributed significantly higher ability to the
actor than did observers witnessing an ascending pattern
of feedback.

When observers witnessed a descending

pattern of correct responses and did not anticipate
fixture interaction with the actor they attributed better
performance to him than when, under the same expectation
of future interaction, they witnessed an ascending pattern
of successes.

This finding is consistent with the results

reported by Jones, et al. (1968).

However, this com

parison yielded no significant difference in attribu
tions of ability.

The finding tha- under no future inter

action feedback did not affect observers' attributions of
ability may be explained by the observer's lack of a
standard of comparison.

Unlike the Jones, et a l . (1968)

study, observers had no exact information regarding the
relationship between level of ability and number of
correct responses.

They only knew that the questions had

been designed to test the intelligence of the brightest
people in the population.

Since a score could not be

translated into a level of ability the most accurate
attributions of ability, given the information possessed
by the observers, was "about average".

The fact that the

mean attribution scores of ability made by observers were
4.9 under descending feedback and 4.43 under ascending
feedback, where a score of four to five was "average
ability", may be interpreted as support for this position.

81

The fact that when observers expected to interact
with the actor in the future for the purpose of obtaining
a financial reward they not only perceived a descending
actor as having more ability, but also favorably distorted
his performance, attributed fewer unlucky guesses to him,
and expected him to get more problems correct on the next
attempt than they did for an ascending actor can be
interpreted in terms of self interest.

Simply put, the

"better" one's partner, the better one's chances of
winning the prize money.
Two additional hypotheses were investigated in the
present experiment.

These predictions dealt with the in

fluence which rewards and order would exert on the
subjects' attribution processes.

In each instance partial

support was obtained for these hypotheses.
The hypothesis that both actors and observers would
make more positive attributions, other than for respon
sibility, under high reward conditions was partially con
firmed .

High reward subjects, regardless of role, made

attributions of better performance, higher ability, and
more good luck than did low reward subjects.

This finding

was consistent with the results reported by Apsler and
Friedman (1975) and Lerner (1965).

The only dependent

variable not affected by the reward manipulation was the
subjects' ratings of "liking" for the other subject.
significant differences were obtained for this measure

No
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under

any of the treatment conditions.

This is contrary

to what might be expected, based on the findings of Apsler
and Friedman (1975).

However, in their study observers

were informed that the actors had been ambiguously assig
ned a high or a low reward.

The reward which the observer

received was not manipulated.

Observers in the Apsler

and Friedman (1975) study perceived the actor as less
"good" under the low reward condition.

In the present

study, however, both actors and observers received the same
rewards.
Walster (1966) has proposed that the tendency for an
observer to attribute responsibility to victims of
suffering is due to the reassurance the observer gains
from this type of "defensive" attribution.

Unless ob

servers hold such victims responsible for their unhappy
states, suggests Walster, they must face the possibility
that similar occurrences could happen to them.

In the

present experiment it was expected that low reward subjects
would be more disliked than would standard or high reward
subjects.

It is suggested that the reason why subjects in

the low reward conditions of the present experiment were
not "disliked" is that both received the low reward.

In

Walster's terminology, they were not in a position to
make "defensive" attributions because the same "unhappy"
fate had happened to them.
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Partial support was also obtained for the hypothesis
that order would not affect the attributions of subjects.
A main effect for order, i.e. whether a subject served
in a certain role first or second was obtained for attri
butions of performance.

First order subjects tended to

make lower attributions of performance than did second
order subjects.

It is suggested that during the first

session of problem solving neither subject was paying
strict attention to the number of correct responses made.
Actors were involved in arriving at solutions to the
problems and making responses, whereas observers were also
concentrating on solving the problems, although they made
no responses, since they knew that their turn would be
next to use the apparatus and respond to the problems.
When the first problem solving session was completed both
subjects filled out the questionnaire before switching
roles and beginning the second session.

The questionnaire

undoubtedly cued the subjects to attend to the number of
problems correctly solved, thus accounting for the main
effect which order had for this dependent variable.

The

fact that first order subjects made lower performance
attributions than second order subjects may be accounted
for by the information they had received about the nature
of the problems.

Prior to beginning the experiment, sub

jects were told that the problems had been deve.loped
specifically for discriminating among intelligence levels
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of the brightest people in the population.

They were

further advised not to be concerned if they didn’t get a
large number of the problems correct.

This information,

coupled with the fact that during the first problem
solving session they had not specifically attended to the
number of correct responses, resulted in the lower first
order performance attributions obtained.
A significant order by role interaction was obtained
for attributions of expected future performance.

While

actors, regardless of order, expected to get about the
same number of problems correct on a future attempt
(X^=17.06, X2=16.35), second order observers expected
better future performance (X=18.7) than did first order
observers (X=16.13).

This order effect for observers was

significant at the .01 level of confidence.
The explanation for this interaction seems to lie
in the nature of the tasks performed by subjects in the
actor and observer roles.

The actors had to attend to

the problems as they were presented on the screen,
formulate solutions, and respond by pressing the approp
riate button.

Actors also had to be sure that the

correct toggle switch, corresponding to the problem on
the screen, was depressed.

This necessity for having the

appropriate toggle switch depressed was emphasized in the
pre-experimental instructions.

The observers, on the

other hand, were merely instructed to "watch what's
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going on".

They also viewed the problems on the screen

and received feedback, visual and audio, via a console on
their desk.

As has been previously stated, all subjects

made lower attributions of performance after the first
session than they did after the second session.

The

initial completion of the questionnaire undoubtedly cued
both actors and observers to attend more closely to the
number of problems solved correctly.

Due to the more

complex nature of the actor’s tasks, however, this cueing
effect exercised less influence on their attention to the
number of problems they solved correctly.

They had too

many other things to do and consequently had less con
fidence than the observers in recalling their actual
performance.
It is suggested that the order by role interaction
obtained for expected future performance is a function of
the differential cueing effect described above.

The

better one perceives another’s performance, the better he
will expect the person to do on a future attempt at the
same task.

That this was the case in the present experi

ment is demonstrated by the high positive correlation
(p=.0001) between attributions of performance and those
of expected future performance.

Thus second order actors,

because of this lack of confidence in the accuracy of
their performance recall, were more conservative in
predicting their future performance.

The observers, on
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the other hand, having more confidence in their second
order attributions of performance predicted that the
actor would make more correct responses on his future
attempt.
In summary, the present experiment revealed that the
situational variables of reward, role, future expectations,
and feedback of success were capable of altering the
subjects1 attribution processes in a number of ways.

The

results indicated the general influence of a primacy
effect for feedback upon the attribution processes of
both actors and observers involved in the experimental
task.

It was also found that when subjects willingly

engage in an activity which they realize may result in a
negative consequence and feel that they have been in
strumental in determining this outcome they will acknowl
edge their responsibility for this negative consequence.
The results also indicate that the attribution process
was influenced by the self interest of the attributor.
The externality-internality of observer subjects was
affected by their self interest.

Performance was attri

buted either to internal characteristics or to external
factors as a function of the observer's self interest.
In terms of the divergent attribution hypothesis
(Jones and Nisbett, 1972) the findings of the present
experiment suggest that for certain types of attribu
tions, e.g. ability at a particular task, some standard
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of comparison is utilized by both actors and observers.
As Jones and Nisbett (1972) have suggested, the actor
compares his actions in a particular situation to his
previous actions in similar situations, i.e. his relevant
past history, whereas the observer compares the actions of
a particular actor to those of other actors.

The present

experiment indicates that certain situations, as a func
tion of their novelty, may provide no standars of social
comparison upon which to base ability attributions and
thereby result in the elimination of role as a factor in
the attribution process.

The results further suggest

that certain situational variables, such as reward and
self interest, affect the attribution processes of both
actors and observers in a similar manner.
The findings of the present research may have some
practical implications with respect to various types of
educational programs.

For example, the results of the

present research may be applied to programs which seek to
impart work skills to the underprivi1edged in industrial
ability.

In such training situations it may often be

that the trainees attribute relatively low levels of
ability to themselves and that this type of self attribu
tion may act as a "self fulfilling prophecy" which
seriously reduces the benefits of such training.

The

results obtained in the present experiment suggest that
the learning tasks might be structured and presented in
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a manner that results in an initial series of successes
as a method of overcoming these initially negative self
attributions.

The results further suggest that the self

interest motive of the trainees should be activated,
whenever possible, in a manner whereby the participants
perceive the situation as one in which it is in their
best interest to succeed at the tasks.

Short term in

centives such as weekly team and/or individual competi
tions for rewards which the participants value may be an
effective means of accomplishing this.

The experimental

results also suggest that the subjects should be allowed
some control over the situation.

Take as an example, a

work skills training program which offers instruction in
several areas, e.g. truck driver, assistant machinist,
fork lift driver, and lathe operator.

Upon entry to such

a program the person could be informed of both the positive
and negative aspects of each area of instruction, e.g.
although assistant machinists earn more money, the
training is longer and most people find it more difficult
than the other courses of instruction.

The person, having

this prior knowledge of the potential negative aspects of
his decision, could then be allowed to select a program.
An orientation could further emphasize that the situation
is one over which his actions determine the outcomes.
It is suggested that by combining the above factors
of initial success, self interest, and the feelings of
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control over the situation the number of people success
fully completing such training programs could be sub
stantially increased.

At the present time such thinking

must be termed speculation, yet it seems a promising area
in which to apply our laboratory derived knowledge of
factors affecting the attribution process.
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APPENDIX A
QUESTIONNAIRES
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1.

In terms of percentage, to what extent were you
responsible for the fact that you and the other sub
ject received the highest/lowest possible payment
for participating in the experiment?

0%
2.

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

How many of the problems did you solve correctly?

0
3.

10%

i
10

5

1
15

i
20

-JL
25

30

What is your reaction to the other subject in this
experiment?

dislike
very
much

!
4.

dislike
dislike somewhat

i

neutral

like
somewhat like

1_____ 1___ -I—

like
very
much

I.. I

How many of your correct answers were the result of
lucky guesses?

10

15

20

25

30

1
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5.

In terms of percentage, to what extent was the other
subject responsible for the fact that you and he
received the highest/lowest possible payment for
participating in the experiment?

I
0%
6.

I

I
10%

l
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40%
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50%
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70%

!_____ 1_____!____ I
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How many problems would you expect to answer correctly
if you had the opportunity to take another test
composed of similar items of comparable difficulty?

0
7.

5

I
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1
15
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I
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.

— I---------25
30

What level of ability, relative to the population
of college students here at LSU, did you demonstrate
in solving the abstract reasoning problems used in
the experiment?

very
well
somewhat
somewhat well
very
low
below
below
above
above
high
ability average average average average average ability
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8.

Which statement do you feel best describes the series
of problems used in this study?
The first portion of the series contained the
most difficult problems.
Item difficulty was arranged in the order of
four difficult to one easy problem.
All problems were of approximately equal
difficulty.
Item difficulty was arranged in the order of
four easy to one difficult problem.
The second portion of the series contained the
most difficult problems1.

9.

On a scale of one to ten, where l=extremely easy and
10=extremely difficult, rate the level of difficulty
of items:

(A) 1 through 15 and (B) items 16 through

30.

(A)

Items one through fifteen:

I— I___ i
1
(B)

i

i

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Items sixteen through thirty:

I

i
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i

9

i

I
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!

I

i
1

10.

i
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i
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i
7
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j
8

i__

9

10

How many of your incorrect answers were the result
of unlucky guesses?
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30
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11.

In terms of percentage of effort expended, how hard
did you try to correctly answer the problems?

J
0

l
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i
20

»
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»
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1
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t
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l
70

t
80
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100
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1.

In terms of percentage, to what extent were you
responsible for the fact that you and the other sub
ject received the highest/lowest payment possible for
participating in the experiment?
i

1

i

0%

2.

10%
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How many problems did the other subject solve
correctly?

I

3.
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What is your raction to the other subject in this
experiment?

dislike
very
much

4.

dislike
dislike somewhat

like
somewhat like

neutral

like
very
much

How many of the other subject's correct answers were
the result of lucky guesses?
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I
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30
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5.

In terms of percentage, to what extent was the other
subject responsible for the fact that you and he
received the highest/lowest possible payment for
participating in the experiment?

I

I

0%

6.

10%
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20%
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30%

40%
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60%
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70%
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80%

I

90%
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100%

How many problems would you expect the other subject
to answer correctly if he had the opportunity to
take another test composed of similar items of
comparable difficulty?

I

I

I

1

I

I

0

5

10

15

20

25

7.

I

30

What level of ability, relative to the population of
college students here at LSU, did the other subject
demonstrate in solving the abstract reasoning prob
lems used in the experiment?

very
well
low
below
ability average

somewhat
somewhat well
very
below
above
above
high
average average average average ability
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8.

Which statement do you feel best describes the series
of problems used in this study?
The first portion of the series contained the
most difficult problems.
Item difficulty was arranged in the order of
four difficult to one easy problem.
A ll problems were of approximately equal
difficulty.
Item difficulty was arranged in the order of
four easy to one difficult problem.
The second portion of the series contained the
most difficult problems.

9.

On a scale of one to ten, where l=extremely easy and
10=extremely difficult, rate the level of difficulty
of items (A) one through fifteen and (B) items six
teen through thirty.

(A) Items one through fifteen:

I i
1
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!__ 1__I__ I__ 1— I— I
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(B) Items sixteen through thirty:
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10.

How many of the other subject's incorrect answers
were the result of unlucky guesses?

11.

In terms of percentage of effort expended, how
hard did the other subject try to correctly answer
the problems?

I
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1.

How many of the problems did you solve correctly?

I 1.1 1 1 1 1 I 1 I I » I > S I I 1 I l i t
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What is your reaction to the other subject in this
experiment?

dislike
very
much

1

3.

dislike
somewhat

dislike

I
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somewhat
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How many of your correct answers were the result of
lucky guesses?
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How many problems would you expect to answer
correctly if you had the opportunity to take another
test composed of similar items of comparable
difficulty?
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5.

What level of ability, relative to the population of
college students here at LSU, did you demonstrate in
solving the abstract reasoning problems used in the
experiment?

very
well
somewhat
somewhat well
very
low
below
below
above
above
high
ability average average average average average ability

6.

On a scale of one to ten, where l=extremely easy and
10 =extremely difficult, rate the level of difficulty

of items:

(A) 1 through 15 and (B) items 16 through

30

(A) Items one through fifteen:
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(B) Items sixteen through thirty:
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7.

Which statement do you feel best describes the series
of problems used in this study?
The first portion of the series contained the
most difficult problems.
Item difficulty was arranged in the order of
'four difficult to one easy problem.
All problems were of approximately equal
'difficulty.
Item difficulty was arranged in the order of
four easy to one difficult problem.
The second portion of the series contained the
most difficult problems 4

8.

How many of your incorrect answers were the result of
unlucky guesses?
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In terms of percentage of effort expended, how hard
did you try to solve the problems correctly?
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1.

How many of the problems did the other subject solve
correctly?

1 I H » | I t \ t—Li i..i i — I i i .
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What is your reaction to the other subject in this
experiment?

dislike
very
much
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How many of the other subject's correct answers were
the result of lucky guesses?
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How many problems would you expect the other subject
to answer correctly if he had the opportunity to take
another tefet composed of similar items of comparable
difficulty?
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5.

What level of ability, relative to the population of
college students here at LSU, did the other subject
demonstrate in solving the abstract reasoning prob
lems used in the experiment?

very
well
low
below
ability average

6.

somewhat
somewhat well
below
above
above
average average average average

very
high
ability

On a scale of one to ten, where l=extremely easy and
10=extremely difficult, rate the level of difficulty
of items:

(A) 1 through 15 and (B) items 16 through

30.

(A) Items one through fifteen:
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(B) Items sixteen through thirty:
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7.

Which statement do you feel best describes the series
of problems used in this study?
The first portion of the series contained the
most difficult problems.
Item difficulty was arranged in the order of
four difficult to one easy problem.
All problems were of approximately equal
difficulty.
Item difficulty was arranged in the order of
four easy to one difficult problem.
The second portion of the series contained the
most difficult problems.

8.

How many of the other subject's incorrect answers
were the result of unlucky guesses?
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In terms of percentage of effort expended, how hard
did the other subject^try to solve the problems
correctly?
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